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BOOK REVIEW
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION, By Roger J. Magnuson.' Wilmette,
Illinois: Callaghan & Co. 1981. Vols. I & II. Pp. xxiii,
chs. 1-9; xv, chs. 10-21. $147.50 for set of two
volumes.
Reviewed by Roderick M Hills2 and Michael Chertoff
A good legal treatise shares the characteristics of both a menu and a
meal: it guides the practitioner through the legal bill of fare, and also
provides food for thought. Roger J. Magnuson's Shareholder Litigation
performs both functions. It is not a legal source book for all purposes,
but it is an excellent introduction to the practical dimensions of securi-
ties litigation, and to the theory of securities enforcement.
The author's metaphor is Biblical. Taking his cue from Ecclesiastes,
Mr. Magnuson describes this two-volume work as an effort to describe
the varieties of corporate "oppression," and their remedies.
Sustaining-indeed, perhaps oversustaining--the Biblical metaphor
throughout his work, Mr. Magnuson leads the reader through the
gamut of federal and state remedies for injuries to shareholders. In-
cluded in the two-volume set is a broad, but not exhaustive, description
of the elements of sections 9, 10, 14 and 16 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and sections 11, 12 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933.
Mr. Magnuson briefly considers state statutory remedies and com-
mon-law causes of action. Shareholder Litigation also discusses the
procedural mechanisms for redress, including shareholder derivative
actions, class actions, and SEC enforcement actions.
Of special interest to the practicing attorney is Mr. Magnuson's at-
tentiveness to the practical problems faced by the securities litigator.
Chapters of Shareholder Litigation consider the process of "educating"
the client, and formal and informal methods of obtaining information.
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For example, the book quite usefully instructs the attorney to look be-
yond discovery procedures available in ordinary civil cases, and to con-
sider sources of information such as federal and state corporate filings,
the Freedom of Information Act, and professional financial informa-
tion services. Finally, the treatise walks the prospective securities liti-
gator through the pre-trial and trial process, directing the lawyer's
attention to procedural matters of particular relevance in a shareholder
litigation context.
The book is well-balanced between discussion of the substantive ele-
ments of securities law and "how to" advice about procedure, starting
at the point that the client walks through the door. The footnote refer-
ences are a valuable point of departure for research into procedural
and substantive issues as they arise during the course of litigation.
Apart from its efforts to map the issues faced by the shareholder lit-
gator, Mr. Magnuson's treatise occasionally delves into specific legal or
practical questions. Mr. Magnuson's discussion of practical considera-
tions includes illustrations from the experiences of unnamed attorneys.
The lawyers' anecdotes are often amusing; whether they will assist the
litigator who draws upon his own fund of experience is, perhaps, ques-
tionable. Elsewhere, the book discusses emerging legal questions gen-
erated by recent court decisions. For example, the book includes
discussions of the continued viability of the "Birnbaum" rule of stand-
ing to sueunder rule lOb-5, the duty to disclose or abstain requirement
established by Chiarella v. United States,5 and the impact of Santa Fe
Industries v. Green.6 Here, the book's reader should exercise caution.
Recent decisions by the courts have significantly unsettled the contours
of securities enforcement law. The reader is well-advised to use Mr.
Magnuson's discussions as a beginning, rather than end, to exploration
of securities law doctrine.
II
Beyond serving as a guide book and intellectual stimulant to the se-
curities litigator, Mr. Magnuson's book purports to carry a moral
message about shareholder litigation. Indeed, Mr. Magnuson's intro-
duction instructs the "thoughtful advocate" to "attune himself to spiri-
tual reality, to right and wrong."
5. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
6. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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But what is "right and wrong" in the field of shareholder law? Espe-
cially during the past ten years, courts, litigants, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission have been engaged in struggling for the soul of
the securities laws. A good deal of the uncertainty in rule lOb-5 doc-
trine is attributable to judicial and administrative decisions which em-
body differing visions of "right and wrong" under rule lOb-5.
The relevance of "right and wrong" can be tested in many types of
lOb-5 litigation, but the fluidity of that concept may be seen most
clearly in the recent case law which deals with trading on "inside" in-
formation. It is axiomatic that one should not "misrepresent," and so
the absolute prohibition of 1Ob-5 that punishes material misrepresenta-
tion of facts concerning securities is easily understood and enforced.
But it is more difficult to address the issue of stock trading when mate-
rial information is not disclosed. Trading without disclosure of infor-
mation is not desirable in all cases. The problem is to determine when
to prohibit and when to permit trading without disclosing. Because the
SEC today under the new leadership of Chairman John Shad, and Di-
rector of Enforcement, John Fedders, has an announced policy of sup-
pressing stock trading on "inside" information, it is timely to inquire
into the "spiritual reality" that is Mr. Magnuson's theme.
One vision of rule 1Ob-5, embodied in cases such as Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States,7 and in the dissenting opinions of Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Blackmun in Chiarella, sees the inside trading
prohibition as a market equalizing device. Under this approach, rule
lOb-5 aims as nearly as possible at ensuring that those who trade in
securities markets have no unjustifiable informational advantages. The
only advantages that are considered legitimate are those which rest
upon the trader's own research, analysis, and judgment.' The dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Blackmun in Chiarella encapsulates this view in
stating that rule lOb-5 prohibits trading where there is "a structural
disparity in access to material information" and a party exploits this
-structural informational advantage through trading in affected
securities." 9
7. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
8. 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, J., dissenting). Rules allowing limited purchases of corporate
stock without disclosure of intent to bid for a takeover may also be justified on the ground of
special efficiencies. Id at 242-43; United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1366-1367 (2d Cir.
1978), rey'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
9. 445 U.S. at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Number 2]
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Contrasting with this equalizing approach is a moral, fault-oriented
vision which the Supreme Court has increasingly adopted in interpret-
ing rule lOb-5. In decisions such as Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,10 and
Aaron v. SEC, I the Supreme Court has imposed scienter requirements
upon private damage and SEC enforcement actions under rule lOb-5.
By establishing scienter as an element of rule lOb-5, especially in the
context of enforcement actions, the Court has signaled that its primary
focus in lOb-5 cases is deterring and compensating for intentional de-
ceit-not the broader goal of promoting a marketplace in which all
transactors are equally situated. Under these cases, liability pivots on
the bad state of mind of the defendant, rather than on the effect of his
conduct upon the marketplace.
The rejection of the equal access to information approach is even
more striking in the Court's decision in Chiarella. There, the Court
expressly declined to adopt a rule lOb-5 theory predicated upon trading
on the basis of superior knowledge not obtainable by the public at-
large. Instead, the Court emphasized that the foundation of rule lOb-5
liability in a nondisclosure case is the determination that the defendant
had a fiduciary relationship with the shareholders with whom he trans-
acted his purchase or sale of stock. Thus, the common-law principle of
fiduciary obligation was engrafted upon rule lOb-5, and relief was
predicated upon the classical misfeasance of betrayal of trust.
These recent Supreme Court decisions adopting a moral, fault-ori-
ented vision of the rule lOb-5 disclosure requirement raise doctrinal
problems. The obligations imposed upon an individual as a fiduciary
are not necessarily related to the policy of full disclosure in the market-
place. A corporate fiduciary is often expected to maintain information
about corporate plans in confidence. In such instances, publication of
corporate plans is as gross a violation of the insider's fiduciary duty as
would be secret trading on the information. Yet rule lOb-5 is satisfied
if the corporate fiduciary discloses secret corporate plans to the world,
and then makes his purchase of corporate stock. Indeed, when the SEC
suspects that information about corporate plans has leaked out, the
Commission may pressure the officers to disclose information to the
public, without regard to whether such general disclosure comports
10. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
11. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
[Vol. 60:735
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with the officers' fiduciary duty to serve the best interests of their
corporation.
To be sure, rule lOb-5 and the common law of fiduciary obligations
are not inconsistent: an insider can satisfy both by declining to trade at
all when he possesses inside information. But the common law goes
further than lOb-5 in the sense that it prohibits disclosure by the in-
sider. The common law aims at policy goals of promoting fiduciary
loyalty that are logically unrelated to the policies underlying disclosure
requirements. This fundamental incongruity between rule lOb-5 and
the common law of fiduciaries makes it dubious to link them by treat-
ing the fiduciary relationship as an element of the rule lOb-5 offense.
As a result of this linkage, the rule is that an outside corporate consul-
tant is proscribed from trading in stock on the basis of information he
receives, while the casual passerby who overhears the same corporate
secret is not so inhibited. Significantly, that difference in status has no
discernable effect upon the behavior of the marketplace or upon the
behavior of the ordinary investor.
The tenuity of the connection between the rule lOb-5 policy of non-
disclosure and the duty of fiduciary loyalty is further highlighted by the
conceptual contortion performed by courts which seek to treat the cor-
porate insider who sells securities as a fiduciary of the new purchaser of
those securities. At the time the selling insider undertook his fiduciary
duty, the purchaser was not a shareholder and hence not the benefici-
ary of that obligation. To establish a fiduciary relationship at the time
of sale, therefore, the courts have maintained the metaphysical fiction
that the fiduciary relationship arises at the very moment that the sale is
consummated. 12
Similarly, the concept of scienter which seems appropriate when ana-
lyzing a common law deceit claim, fits rather awkwardly into the ele-
ments of the rule lOb-5 offense of nondisclosure of material
information. In a misstatement or half-truth case, it is fairly easy to
identify the scienter question that will arise: Whether the defendant
knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that the information he dissemi-
nated was false.
The application of scienter to a non-disclosure case is less clear. Is
the scienter question whether the defendant knowingly or recklessly
failed to disclose the information, as, for example, when he means to
12. 445 U.S. at 227 n.8; Gratz v. Cloughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951).
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communicate a particular fact but forgets to do so? That issue will
arise very rarely. Is the scienter issue whether the defendant failed to
discover information that he should have disclosed, or failed to super-
vise another who failed to disclose? That kind of scienter question only
arises when the defendant is sued on a derivative liability theory, such
as aiding and abetting, or the employer-employee relationship. 13
But how does scienter apply in the ordinary case where the defend-
ant has received material nonpublic information and trades without
disclosing it? In such a circumstance, the scienter issue must revolve
around whether the defendant knew, or was reckless in failing to know,
that the information in question was material and nonpublic. Thus, in
the simple nondisclosure setting, the scienter requirement serves no
purpose other than to recapitulate the rule lOb-5 elements of material-
ity and nonpublication. In short, the element of scienter is redundant
in the factual circumstances that generate a large number of garden
variety lOb-5 nondisclosure cases. 14
These conceptual difficulties suggest that legal principles associated
with moral fault do not fit comfortably within a full disclosure statute.
Two solutions may be indicated. One is to construe rule lOb-5 in the
nondisclosure context as a mandate for equal access to the marketplace.
So understood, the fiduciary duty rule established by Chiarella would
have to be reversed, and the scienter requirement abolished at least in
enforcement actions. Such a reconstructed lOb-5 nondisclosure princi-
ple would be coherent, since the scope of the disclosure obligation
could be defined through explicit formulation of a policy governing the
flow of information in the marketplace. However, adoption of such an
overtly policy-making approach to rule lOb-5 would doubtless be con-
troversial, unless undertaken or approved by Congress itself in the
course of a reconsideration of section 10 of the Securities Exchange
Act.
The alternative solution is to recognize that a federal lOb-5 rule gov-
erning failure to disclose makes no sense as a duplication of common-
law rules governing breach of duty. Bare inside trading, therefore,
13. See, ag., 425 U.S. 185; 446 U.S. 680.
14. Scienter could be treated as a distinct element of the rule lOb-5 inside trading offense if it
were defined to require a showing of the defendant's specific intent to take advantage of inside
information. Such an interpretation would eliminate the redundancy problem but it would create
two different versions of scienter, one for misrepresentation cases, and one for inside trading
cases.
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should be regulated as a breach of fiduciary obligation, under the ap-
propriate state laws. That would leave rule lOb-5 enforcement to those
situations where defendant has misrepresented or told half-truths.
Since misrepresentation is always undesirable, there is no need to dis-
criminate between "good" and "bad" misrepresentation by choosing
between a morally-oriented and an efficiency-oriented view of securi-
ties trading.
It is no fault of Mr. Magnuson that these conceptual problems are
beyond the scope of his book. The rhetoric of morality that Share-
holder Litigation advances, however, inevitably stimulates further
thought about the wisdom of the securities enforcement rules as cur-
rently constructed. Perhaps Mr. Magnuson will turn his knowledge
and practical experience to exploring the deeper issues involved in
shareholder litigation in his next book.
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